Dakota

Fish in Mouth

View larger image

As you have no doubt heard, our esteemed leader, when asked by the German weekly "Bild on Sontag" to describe the best moment of his presidency replied "I would say the best moment of all was when I caught a 7.5 pound (3.402 kilos) perch in my lake." Once again demonstrating for the world that the Emperor has no brain cells. He also seems to have confabulated once again, a symptom of Korsakoff's Syndrome.

At least he had the decency not to say that 9/11 was his best day because it provided him with the opportunity to take charge and begin to demolish democracy for all his neoconservative, and fundamentalist buddies. On that fine day, he went from ineffective,confused wimp (reading "My Pet Goat" ito kindergarteners) to Big American Hero, Fearless Freedom Forcer, Our Savior.

I'm really worried about the guy. Remember Boris Yeltzin and his little problem? "The complexities involved in situations such as Yeltsin's were examined by the Committee on Governmental Agencies, Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, in its study The VIP with Psychiatric Impairment. ('VIP,'of course, stands for 'Very Important Person,' a term coined by Sir Winston Churchill.) The study noted that associates of a public personality tend to 'conceal the weakness of their leader from public view, to the point of blocking diagnosis and effective care' It said that competence to perform a job or hold political office is generally considered not a medical question but a matter of political judgment."

Dan Froomkin at washingtonpost.com continues to impress all of us here at Dakota with his honest reporting, from deep within the bowels of a newspaper which continues to harbor the disgraced Bob Woodward. They must not know about him, or he gets so many hits they can't afford to fire him. Anyway he often quotes the President verbatim, rather than trying to make sense of his syntax and impaired thought process. Here goes:

"After talking about his rug (see Peter Baker 's classic story from the Post in March) and even before getting a single question, Bush started venting.

'The interesting thing about Washington is that they want me to change -- they being the -- and I'm not changing, you know. You can't make decisions if you don't know who you are, and you flip around with the politics. You've got to stay strong in what you believe and optimistic about that you'll get good results.'And so --the other thing I want you to know about me is that no matter how pressurized it may seem, I'm not changing what I believe. . . . I'm not changing. I don't care whether they like me at the cocktail parties, or not. I want to be able to leave this office with my integrity intact.'
And he referred to the Oval Office as 'a shrine to democracy. And we treat it that way. When people walk in here, they -- they don't come in here in bathing suits and flip-flops. They come in here dressed like they'd come to a shrine.'"

Well okay.

Really, as Steven Colbert would tell us, this is no laughing matter. I received this email, which I'm assuming is permissible to publish (so sue me, people need to know) to which I cannot link due to my lack of technical expertise. Thus I shall drop the whole thing upon you in an extended entry. It is from the Nelson Report, a subscriber newsletter written by Chris Nelson, former UPI reporter, and involves the faux pas that happened during Chinese President Hu's visit. China holds alot of US currency, and it behoves us to treat them well, lest they find themselves upset with us;

Photo note: an oldie that was too perfect to pass up.

USH/HU GOSSIP...
we see mistakes, Chinese see intent
SUMMARY: a really interesting "behind the curtain" drama is playing out as senior level sources in Washington and Beijing tell similar stories about a series of incidents during the Hu/Bush White House meeting two weeks ago...but the explanations, and the potential outcomes stemming from these interpretations, could not be more different.

The bottom line, we are told by both US and Chinese sources, is that President Hu and his advisors were infuriated by the incidents (detailed below), that they absolutely are convinced that the incidents were intentional, and not "mistakes", and that tempers have not calmed since returning to Beijing.

Whether any of this substantively affects either Chinese or US negotiations on the Iran situation at the UN, or the 6 Party Talks, must be pure speculation and, in any event, one would have to hope that professionalism, and common sense assessment of national interest would overcome almost any personal slight, whether intended, or not.

On less cosmic level, however, both Chinese and US sources say there is word that Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing almost certainly will be fired because of the problems, and that the career of the very able, respected Ambassador Zhou Wenzhong may also be in jeopardy. Indeed, a close family member has been telling friends that his fate seems sealed.

On the US side, it is not clear how much the senior levels of the White House quite grasp the Chinese perception of the incidents and mistakes, but some sources say that at a minimum, the various problems help explain why there has been no decision announcing the permanent appointment of NSC Acting Senior Director for Asia Dennis Wilder.

First, here are the basic stories, as retailed to us by a variety of US and Chinese sources. Please understand that we are not in a position to say which version is fact, but we can say that these are stories which the Chinese side, at a minimum, say they feel are true:

1. You already know of the first faux pas, the White House announcer intoning, "And now, the national anthem of The Republic of China"...that is, Taiwan. No one on the Chinese side thinks this was anything less than deliberate, especially in view of the rest of the issues. No one on the American side thinks it was other than gross stupidity and staff failure.

2. You already know about the Falun Gong journalist turned demonstrator; our initial report (4/21) asked whether the NSC's Wilder had responsibility for clearing her in. We were then told that Wilder had not been involved; finally, we were told he was involved, but had scrubbed her name. Sources familiar with the Chinese position say the Falun Gong lady's name was specifically supplied to the Secret Service with a demand that she be excluded, since she had disrupted then-President Jiang, on Malta, five years ago.

-- it took the Washington Post less than an hour after the White House incident to learn of the Malta event, leading both US and Chinese sources to ask whether the Secret Service ran any check at all on the reporter, before clearing her in.

-- US sources say this time, it was the NSC press office which did the clearance, not the Asia Directorate. However, a US source says that Wilder and the NSC were involved in press clearance for the Crawford visit which was cancelled last year. This source speculates that the basic list from that date may have been used for the White House visit; but the source could not recall if the Crawford list was for organizations, or also included individuals.

-- either way, the Chinese say the demonstrator was specifically ID'd in advance, yet still was admitted to the White House grounds by the Secret Service, and they ascribe purpose, not sloppiness, as the reason.

3. Chinese and US sources say that when the Falun Gong demonstrator started to shout, the Chinese liaison to the Secret Service demanded immediate action, but was told that since the woman had passed through the full weapons inspection process, she was not a security threat, and so was subject to action by the D.C. Police. This is why it took some three minutes for authorities to get to her, we were told.

4. Chinese and US sources say that while the Falun Gong organization was given a permit to demonstrate in Lafayette Park, the written permit expired at 11 p.m., by agreement with the Secret Service, thus allowing President Hu a quiet sleep. At 11 p.m., the demonstrators were still carrying on. Sources say the Chinese called the Secret Service to complain, but were told that this matter falls under the jurisdiction of the D.C. Police.

-- sources say that when the D.C. Police were called, the Chinese were told that they had a long-standing overtime pay dispute with the White House, and that their responsibility expired at 10 p.m.

5. Bush's State Department supplied translator is said, by sources on both sides, to have done a poor job. We are told that the NSC had had problems with this individual's competence before, and had basically told State "send anyone but...". But State sent this individual. Given what the Chinese see as an overall pattern of apparent sabotage, this becomes an "incident".

-- explanation, if any there be, ranges from the conspiratorial (State was resentful at some lengthy period of bickering over difficult issues) to the mundane...there's a duty list, and that's who was on that day. One would think that for a US-China summit nothing less than the absolutely agreed-upon finest personnel would be involved, but if overall supervision is flawed, or lacking, what seems logical from the outside may be irrelevant in practice.

6. More generally, Chinese sources charge that the Hu visit was deliberately disrespected by the White House in a variety of symbolic ways (despite the full-State Visit grant of a 21 gun salute, the ceremony on the lawn, etc.) such as the decision that no Chinese flags would be flown, even though India, also on a "working visit", recently had flags everywhere.

-- some of this sounds silly, but taken in context, and taken in consideration of the massive Chinese campaign, reaching back some 18 months, for a full State Visit, you can see how the importance of any one request denied, or mishandled, when combined with the various incidents noted above, could lead even the most open minded Chinese to "connect the dots" and, at the very least, to ask some hard questions about White House intentions.

7. In fact, as we noted above, Chinese officials, from the senior level on down, are now clearly acting under authorization to express, with some detail, the displeasure of President Hu and his senior aids...and some sound quite sincere in speculating that heads will roll both here, and in Beijing, as a result.

-- whether any similar analysis or retribution is contemplated by the White House is anyone's guess...but on the weight of six year's evidence so far, whenever there's a question of loyalty vs. punishment, loyalty wins every time. How China will interpret that is not hard to guess.

8. After hearing some of this directly from Chinese sources, one friend asks how any serious Chinese official could construct a logical explanation for why the White House would think that the US would benefit from a deliberate orchestration of all these events?

-- one answer comes from another US expert, who notes that "a Chinese assessment of our intentions [that] statements that people in important positions want to humiliate, contain, and change China. These people [it is felt] work indefatigably to sour the relationship and harm China--and also will go to any lengths to preclude Taiwan reunification--even if desired by the people of Taiwan", according to Chinese who hold that assessment.

9. While it is fun to talk about The Blue Team, to most of us, such a "conspiracy theory" so obviously collapses of its own weight as to not merit serious discussion. Not that there aren't some seriously anti-China players in the Bush Administration, as in any administration since Nixon...but the idea that President Bush and the NSC would plan and carry out any such series of public humiliations of Hu, the man they are trying to convince to support the US on Iran at the UN...please...

-- not to mention the other, equally obvious points of common interest...N. Korea, trade, terrorism, etc.; not to mention simple common sense and protocol.

10. But in some ways, the truth is almost equally disquieting as the conspiracy theories held by some Chinese. Looking at each of the incidents noted above, a common theme emerges, and it is not flattering:

-- incompetence, sloppiness, passing-the-buck, incredible stupidity; fatigue, too much to do for too few people; distractions; White House staff turmoil, turnover at the top...you can make your own list, and then ask where the above list differs, in structure and implication, from Katrina, for example, or if you really want to get down to it, Iraq?

11. There are other issues...explanations, not excuses...which may, unfortunately, sound to the Chinese like vindication of a conspiracy: there is no question that 18 months of pestering, and often contentious negotiations with the Embassy here, and officials in Beijing, over what eventually became the working visit of April 20, left officials and staff at State, Commerce, USTR (US Trade Representative), DOD and the White House in a frequently less-than-patient mood.

-- throw in increasing US frustration, in the months leading up to the JCCT (U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade) meeting of early April, with what became obvious to all involved...that Hu was not prepared to make serious, substantive responses to many if not most of the issues which the White House, USTR and Commerce were battling, often on China's behalf, with Congress;

-- throw in increasing US frustration, in the months leading up to the Hu visit, with China's intransigence on Iran, and what is seen here, on a bipartisan basis, as China's less-than-full use of presumed leverage on N. Korea to return to the 6 PT;

-- look at the negative elements involved in Deputy Secretary of State Bob Zoellick's famous "responsible stakeholder" speech...including China's involvement with Sudan, Iran, Burma, and other international malefactors (in American eyes);

-- throw-in especially the rising White House, Congressional, and intellectual disenchantment with human and religious rights under the Hu government, press rights...add up all these issues and attitudes and more and, well...you can see how even with the best intentions in the world, an atmosphere was likely prevalent at many levels in the Bush Administration which could...certainly unconsciously in most cases...result in a disinclination to take that extra step, to check one more time, to make sure the other person really did what they promised;

-- how much might these factors been multiplied as it became clear that while Hu was bringing a serious trade mission, he wasn't making even a single gesture in the direction of human and religious rights, despite very specific White House and direct Presidential requests?

-- remember, officials as high as Commerce Secretary Gutierrez made public statements threatening to cancel the JCCT meeting, and others asked, darkly, "Why is he coming!?"

12. A final note, on the Chinese side. Sources say that Foreign Minister Li may be unjustly blamed for the various incidents noted above, but he cannot escape culpability for really bad political advice. Apparently it was he who urged President Hu to continue to work for a White House meeting, even if it did not receive formal State Visit status...rather than the Crawford Ranch "working visit" which the White House offered last year.

-- sources say that somehow, Li missed, or discounted the demonstrable fact that to George Bush, a working visit at the ranch is a higher sign of seriousness of purpose than any mere ceremony at The White House....and that Crawford visits are both highly coveted, and rarely extended. In China, if not here, such bad advice generally suffers repercussions.

Posted by Dakota at May 9, 2006 07:00 AM